Today I learned…

…what is Chomsky’s objection to Foucault’s moral relativity.

There are many online platforms, writings, primary and secondary sources tackling the question of moral relativism from opposing poles. Today, with no background whatsoever in this topic and its wider dominion, I encountered Noam Chomsky’s critique of Michel Foucault in relation to his moral relativism.

And this is what I made out of it.

First off, Chomsky debates that there are no moral relativists in real life, just like there are no skeptics. As he says “You can discuss it in a philosophy seminar, but no human being can in fact be a skeptic. They wouldn’t survive two minutes if they were.” Which reminds me of Blaise Pascale’s claim on the inexistence of a perfectly genuine skeptic: “Nature backs up helpless reason and stops it going so wildly astray”. So, what Chomsky says is that moral relativism, like skepticism, can be professed and discussed abstractly but never fully acted upon in daily life.

On the other hand Chomsky emphasises that he is not denying the variation within cultures when it comes to what’s moral and what’s not. He in fact agrees that there is such a thing as relativity of moral values in the same way that any other trait or practice vary widely among different human populations. However, he rejects that this variation in moral systems is infinite. According to Chomsky, even when one goes into deep exploration of this relativity, he will only end up discovering that there is a universality to it. While there is a range of variation, this range has its limits; and moral relativism becomes incoherent the moment one claims that the scope of variation is limitless. Chomsky opposes this belief which he says is professed by Foucault.

A biological example Chomsky gives is useful at this point: We have different visual systems than insects. In simple terms, what makes our visual development different is the built-in genetic mechanisms. This means all variety allowed by the already determined genetic structure can be manifest. Yet, this doesn’t mean we can have insect eyes. Yes, within the scope of human eye or primate eye or mammal eye there is variation. But the fact that we concede the idea of this visual system being acquired somehow, in this case by genetic inheritance, shows that we commit to a fixed origin.

If we apply this idea to any other form of acquisition, say language or culture acquisition, we again have to face the question: “How do we make the leap from scattered data to constructing the specific outcome (language or culture)?” Chomsky points out, coming up with a scientific theory works the exact same way. In the end, there must be an already in-built framework that can lead this leap from multiplicity of data to a unit or system.

This is why Chomsky argues: “The most extreme moral relativist is actually committed to the belief in universal values.” Once we argue that there are infinitely varying moral values, we have already accepted that there is an inherent mechanism allowing us to acquire all kinds of moral values.

Now I’d like to give it a good time to read and digest Foucault, and one day I may come with a mature understanding of the degree and kind of moral relativism in his work.